The Case For A Timetable

Daniel Larison, substitute blogging at the Daily Dish today, first points out the not only is the Anbar Awakening not part of the counterinsurgency strategy as McCain has recently claimed, is is actually a tactic that runs counter to the strategy in that it directs power away from the central government. At this point we have large numbers of Sunni who are loyal, not to the Iraq government, but to the jobs that we are paying them for and that have been promised by the Iraq government. What happens when the Iraq government reneges on those jobs, as has been the case so far?

He also points out the a withdrawal based on "conditions on the ground" is an exercise in futility, as is demonstrated by the multiple bombings the past few days.

"...one of the strongest criticisms against it, which is that it allows American policy to be dictated by whichever group wishes to foment chaos and disorder."

Of course, policy under Bush has always been reactive rather than proactive; always one step behind the enemy and therefor always on the losing end of tactic after tactic. Dictated by those who do not wish us well.

How will American presence prevent the type of violence that happened these past few days anyway? I suppose that if we put enough forces; with enough blast walls and a squad at every intersection of every town might we interdict most of the bombers, but even that would not prevent all of them. Clearly there are not that many forces in our entire military. So the forces we have there now provide the illusion of some sort of security but, as this past week illustrated, clearly it is not much more than an illusion.

So what provides the "conditions on the ground" that permits withdrawal?
And should we wait for it?